| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, cgroup: Fix kernel BUG in purge_effective_progs
Syzkaller reported a triggered kernel BUG as follows:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:925!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 194 Comm: detach Not tainted 5.19.0-14184-g69dac8e431af #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__cgroup_bpf_detach+0x1f2/0x2a0
Code: 00 e8 92 60 30 00 84 c0 75 d8 4c 89 e0 31 f6 85 f6 74 19 42 f6 84
28 48 05 00 00 02 75 0e 48 8b 80 c0 00 00 00 48 85 c0 75 e5 <0f> 0b 48
8b 0c5
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000055bdb0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888100ec0800 RCX: ffffc900000f1000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888100ec4578
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888100ec0800 R09: 0000000000000040
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888100ec4000
R13: 000000000000000d R14: ffffc90000199000 R15: ffff888100effb00
FS: 00007f68213d2b80(0000) GS:ffff88813bc80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f74a0e5850 CR3: 0000000102836000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cgroup_bpf_prog_detach+0xcc/0x100
__sys_bpf+0x2273/0x2a00
__x64_sys_bpf+0x17/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f68214dbcb9
Code: 08 44 89 e0 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff8
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb487db68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000b RCX: 00007f68214dbcb9
RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 00007ffeb487db70 RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000012 R09: 0000000b00000003
R10: 00007ffeb487db70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeb487dc20
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000055f74a1011b0
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Repetition steps:
For the following cgroup tree,
root
|
cg1
|
cg2
1. attach prog2 to cg2, and then attach prog1 to cg1, both bpf progs
attach type is NONE or OVERRIDE.
2. write 1 to /proc/thread-self/fail-nth for failslab.
3. detach prog1 for cg1, and then kernel BUG occur.
Failslab injection will cause kmalloc fail and fall back to
purge_effective_progs. The problem is that cg2 have attached another prog,
so when go through cg2 layer, iteration will add pos to 1, and subsequent
operations will be skipped by the following condition, and cg will meet
NULL in the end.
`if (pos && !(cg->bpf.flags[atype] & BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI))`
The NULL cg means no link or prog match, this is as expected, and it's not
a bug. So here just skip the no match situation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix the assign logic of iocb
commit 18ae8d12991b ("f2fs: show more DIO information in tracepoint")
introduces iocb field in 'f2fs_direct_IO_enter' trace event
And it only assigns the pointer and later it accesses its field
in trace print log.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc04cef3d30
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000007
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
pc : trace_raw_output_f2fs_direct_IO_enter+0x54/0xa4
lr : trace_raw_output_f2fs_direct_IO_enter+0x2c/0xa4
sp : ffffffc0443cbbd0
x29: ffffffc0443cbbf0 x28: ffffff8935b120d0 x27: ffffff8935b12108
x26: ffffff8935b120f0 x25: ffffff8935b12100 x24: ffffff8935b110c0
x23: ffffff8935b10000 x22: ffffff88859a936c x21: ffffff88859a936c
x20: ffffff8935b110c0 x19: ffffff8935b10000 x18: ffffffc03b195060
x17: ffffff8935b11e76 x16: 00000000000000cc x15: ffffffef855c4f2c
x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 000000000000004e x12: ffff0000ffffff00
x11: ffffffef86c350d0 x10: 00000000000010c0 x9 : 000000000fe0002c
x8 : ffffffc04cef3d28 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 0000000002000000
x5 : ffffff8935b11e9a x4 : 0000000000006250 x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04
x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : ffffffef86a0a31f x0 : ffffff8935b10000
Call trace:
trace_raw_output_f2fs_direct_IO_enter+0x54/0xa4
print_trace_fmt+0x9c/0x138
print_trace_line+0x154/0x254
tracing_read_pipe+0x21c/0x380
vfs_read+0x108/0x3ac
ksys_read+0x7c/0xec
__arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall+0x60/0x150
el0_svc_common.llvm.1237943816091755067+0xb8/0xf8
do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
Fix it by copying the required variables for printing and while at
it fix the similar issue at some other places in the same file. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/gntdev: Accommodate VMA splitting
Prior to this commit, the gntdev driver code did not handle the
following scenario correctly with paravirtualized (PV) Xen domains:
* User process sets up a gntdev mapping composed of two grant mappings
(i.e., two pages shared by another Xen domain).
* User process munmap()s one of the pages.
* User process munmap()s the remaining page.
* User process exits.
In the scenario above, the user process would cause the kernel to log
the following messages in dmesg for the first munmap(), and the second
munmap() call would result in similar log messages:
BUG: Bad page map in process doublemap.test pte:... pmd:...
page:0000000057c97bff refcount:1 mapcount:-1 \
mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:...
...
page dumped because: bad pte
...
file:gntdev fault:0x0 mmap:gntdev_mmap [xen_gntdev] readpage:0x0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5e
print_bad_pte.cold+0x66/0xb6
unmap_page_range+0x7e5/0xdc0
unmap_vmas+0x78/0xf0
unmap_region+0xa8/0x110
__do_munmap+0x1ea/0x4e0
__vm_munmap+0x75/0x120
__x64_sys_munmap+0x28/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
...
For each munmap() call, the Xen hypervisor (if built with CONFIG_DEBUG)
would print out the following and trigger a general protection fault in
the affected Xen PV domain:
(XEN) d0v... Attempt to implicitly unmap d0's grant PTE ...
(XEN) d0v... Attempt to implicitly unmap d0's grant PTE ...
As of this writing, gntdev_grant_map structure's vma field (referred to
as map->vma below) is mainly used for checking the start and end
addresses of mappings. However, with split VMAs, these may change, and
there could be more than one VMA associated with a gntdev mapping.
Hence, remove the use of map->vma and rely on map->pages_vm_start for
the original start address and on (map->count << PAGE_SHIFT) for the
original mapping size. Let the invalidate() and find_special_page()
hooks use these.
Also, given that there can be multiple VMAs associated with a gntdev
mapping, move the "mmu_interval_notifier_remove(&map->notifier)" call to
the end of gntdev_put_map, so that the MMU notifier is only removed
after the closing of the last remaining VMA.
Finally, use an atomic to prevent inadvertent gntdev mapping re-use,
instead of using the map->live_grants atomic counter and/or the map->vma
pointer (the latter of which is now removed). This prevents the
userspace from mmap()'ing (with MAP_FIXED) a gntdev mapping over the
same address range as a previously set up gntdev mapping. This scenario
can be summarized with the following call-trace, which was valid prior
to this commit:
mmap
gntdev_mmap
mmap (repeat mmap with MAP_FIXED over the same address range)
gntdev_invalidate
unmap_grant_pages (sets 'being_removed' entries to true)
gnttab_unmap_refs_async
unmap_single_vma
gntdev_mmap (maps the shared pages again)
munmap
gntdev_invalidate
unmap_grant_pages
(no-op because 'being_removed' entries are true)
unmap_single_vma (For PV domains, Xen reports that a granted page
is being unmapped and triggers a general protection fault in the
affected domain, if Xen was built with CONFIG_DEBUG)
The fix for this last scenario could be worth its own commit, but we
opted for a single commit, because removing the gntdev_grant_map
structure's vma field requires guarding the entry to gntdev_mmap(), and
the live_grants atomic counter is not sufficient on its own to prevent
the mmap() over a pre-existing mapping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mad: Don't call to function that might sleep while in atomic context
Tracepoints are not allowed to sleep, as such the following splat is
generated due to call to ib_query_pkey() in atomic context.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1888000 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2492 rb_commit+0xc1/0x220
CPU: 0 PID: 1888000 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0-305.3.1.el8.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module_el8.3.0+555+a55c8938 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ib-comp-unb-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
RIP: 0010:rb_commit+0xc1/0x220
RSP: 0000:ffffa8ac80f9bca0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff8951c7c01300 RBX: ffff8951c7c14a00 RCX: 0000000000000246
RDX: ffff8951c707c000 RSI: ffff8951c707c57c RDI: ffff8951c7c14a00
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8951c7c01300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000246
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff964c70c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8951fbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f20e8f39010 CR3: 000000002ca10005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
ring_buffer_unlock_commit+0x1d/0xa0
trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x3b/0x1b0
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x67/0x1d0
trace_event_raw_event_ib_mad_recv_done_handler+0x11c/0x160 [ib_core]
ib_mad_recv_done+0x48b/0xc10 [ib_core]
? trace_event_raw_event_cq_poll+0x6f/0xb0 [ib_core]
__ib_process_cq+0x91/0x1c0 [ib_core]
ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
---[ end trace 78ba8509d3830a16 ]--- |
| Uploading unvalidated container images may allow remote attackers to gain full access to the system, potentially compromising its integrity and confidentiality. |
| Weblate is a web based localization tool. Prior to 5.15.2, the screenshot images were served directly by the HTTP server without proper access control. This could allow an unauthenticated user to access screenshots after guessing their filename. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.15.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM
Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the
normal memcpy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: Do not bother merging very long extents
When merging very long extents we try to push as much length as possible
to the first extent. However this is unnecessarily complicated and not
really worth the trouble. Furthermore there was a bug in the logic
resulting in corrupting extents in the file as syzbot reproducer shows.
So just don't bother with the merging of extents that are too long
together. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Unregister devlink params in case interface is down
Currently, in case an interface is down, mlx5 driver doesn't
unregister its devlink params, which leads to this WARN[1].
Fix it by unregistering devlink params in that case as well.
[1]
[ 295.244769 ] WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 1 at net/core/devlink.c:9042 devlink_free+0x174/0x1fc
[ 295.488379 ] CPU: 15 PID: 1 Comm: shutdown Tainted: G S OE 5.15.0-1017.19.3.g0677e61-bluefield #g0677e61
[ 295.509330 ] Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField SoC/BlueField SoC, BIOS 4.2.0.12761 Jun 6 2023
[ 295.543096 ] pc : devlink_free+0x174/0x1fc
[ 295.551104 ] lr : mlx5_devlink_free+0x18/0x2c [mlx5_core]
[ 295.561816 ] sp : ffff80000809b850
[ 295.711155 ] Call trace:
[ 295.716030 ] devlink_free+0x174/0x1fc
[ 295.723346 ] mlx5_devlink_free+0x18/0x2c [mlx5_core]
[ 295.733351 ] mlx5_sf_dev_remove+0x98/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.743534 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2c/0x50
[ 295.751893 ] __device_release_driver+0x19c/0x280
[ 295.761120 ] device_release_driver+0x34/0x50
[ 295.769649 ] bus_remove_device+0xdc/0x170
[ 295.777656 ] device_del+0x17c/0x3a4
[ 295.784620 ] mlx5_sf_dev_remove+0x28/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.794800 ] mlx5_sf_dev_table_destroy+0x98/0x110 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.806375 ] mlx5_unload+0x34/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.815339 ] mlx5_unload_one+0x70/0xe4 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.824998 ] shutdown+0xb0/0xd8 [mlx5_core]
[ 295.833439 ] pci_device_shutdown+0x3c/0xa0
[ 295.841651 ] device_shutdown+0x170/0x340
[ 295.849486 ] __do_sys_reboot+0x1f4/0x2a0
[ 295.857322 ] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x2c/0x40
[ 295.865329 ] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 295.872817 ] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x54/0x184
[ 295.882392 ] do_el0_svc+0x30/0xac
[ 295.889008 ] el0_svc+0x48/0x160
[ 295.895278 ] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130
[ 295.903807 ] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[ 295.911120 ] ---[ end trace 4f1d2381d00d9dce ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: fail to start device if queue setup is interrupted
In ublk_ctrl_start_dev(), if wait_for_completion_interruptible() is
interrupted by signal, queues aren't setup successfully yet, so we
have to fail UBLK_CMD_START_DEV, otherwise kernel oops can be triggered.
Reported by German when working on qemu-storage-deamon which requires
single thread ublk daemon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qed: allow sleep in qed_mcp_trace_dump()
By default, qed_mcp_cmd_and_union() delays 10us at a time in a loop
that can run 500K times, so calls to qed_mcp_nvm_rd_cmd()
may block the current thread for over 5s.
We observed thread scheduling delays over 700ms in production,
with stacktraces pointing to this code as the culprit.
qed_mcp_trace_dump() is called from ethtool, so sleeping is permitted.
It already can sleep in qed_mcp_halt(), which calls qed_mcp_cmd().
Add a "can sleep" parameter to qed_find_nvram_image() and
qed_nvram_read() so they can sleep during qed_mcp_trace_dump().
qed_mcp_trace_get_meta_info() and qed_mcp_trace_read_meta(),
called only by qed_mcp_trace_dump(), allow these functions to sleep.
I can't tell if the other caller (qed_grc_dump_mcp_hw_dump()) can sleep,
so keep b_can_sleep set to false when it calls these functions.
An example stacktrace from a custom warning we added to the kernel
showing a thread that has not scheduled despite long needing resched:
[ 2745.362925,17] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2745.362941,17] WARNING: CPU: 23 PID: 5640 at arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:233 do_IRQ+0x15e/0x1a0()
[ 2745.362946,17] Thread not rescheduled for 744 ms after irq 99
[ 2745.362956,17] Modules linked in: ...
[ 2745.363339,17] CPU: 23 PID: 5640 Comm: lldpd Tainted: P O 4.4.182+ #202104120910+6d1da174272d.61x
[ 2745.363343,17] Hardware name: FOXCONN MercuryB/Quicksilver Controller, BIOS H11P1N09 07/08/2020
[ 2745.363346,17] 0000000000000000 ffff885ec07c3ed8 ffffffff8131eb2f ffff885ec07c3f20
[ 2745.363358,17] ffffffff81d14f64 ffff885ec07c3f10 ffffffff81072ac2 ffff88be98ed0000
[ 2745.363369,17] 0000000000000063 0000000000000174 0000000000000074 0000000000000000
[ 2745.363379,17] Call Trace:
[ 2745.363382,17] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8131eb2f>] dump_stack+0x8e/0xcf
[ 2745.363393,17] [<ffffffff81072ac2>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
[ 2745.363398,17] [<ffffffff81072b4c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50
[ 2745.363404,17] [<ffffffff810d5a8e>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0xae/0xc0
[ 2745.363408,17] [<ffffffff817c99fe>] do_IRQ+0x15e/0x1a0
[ 2745.363413,17] [<ffffffff817c7ac9>] common_interrupt+0x89/0x89
[ 2745.363416,17] <EOI> [<ffffffff8132aa74>] ? delay_tsc+0x24/0x50
[ 2745.363425,17] [<ffffffff8132aa04>] __udelay+0x34/0x40
[ 2745.363457,17] [<ffffffffa04d45ff>] qed_mcp_cmd_and_union+0x36f/0x7d0 [qed]
[ 2745.363473,17] [<ffffffffa04d5ced>] qed_mcp_nvm_rd_cmd+0x4d/0x90 [qed]
[ 2745.363490,17] [<ffffffffa04e1dc7>] qed_mcp_trace_dump+0x4a7/0x630 [qed]
[ 2745.363504,17] [<ffffffffa04e2556>] ? qed_fw_asserts_dump+0x1d6/0x1f0 [qed]
[ 2745.363520,17] [<ffffffffa04e4ea7>] qed_dbg_mcp_trace_get_dump_buf_size+0x37/0x80 [qed]
[ 2745.363536,17] [<ffffffffa04ea881>] qed_dbg_feature_size+0x61/0xa0 [qed]
[ 2745.363551,17] [<ffffffffa04eb427>] qed_dbg_all_data_size+0x247/0x260 [qed]
[ 2745.363560,17] [<ffffffffa0482c10>] qede_get_regs_len+0x30/0x40 [qede]
[ 2745.363566,17] [<ffffffff816c9783>] ethtool_get_drvinfo+0xe3/0x190
[ 2745.363570,17] [<ffffffff816cc152>] dev_ethtool+0x1362/0x2140
[ 2745.363575,17] [<ffffffff8109bcc6>] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x260
[ 2745.363580,17] [<ffffffff817c2116>] ? __schedule+0x3c6/0x9d0
[ 2745.363585,17] [<ffffffff810dbd50>] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x1d0/0x370
[ 2745.363589,17] [<ffffffff816c1e5b>] ? dev_get_by_name_rcu+0x6b/0x90
[ 2745.363594,17] [<ffffffff816de6a8>] dev_ioctl+0xe8/0x710
[ 2745.363599,17] [<ffffffff816a58a8>] sock_do_ioctl+0x48/0x60
[ 2745.363603,17] [<ffffffff816a5d87>] sock_ioctl+0x1c7/0x280
[ 2745.363608,17] [<ffffffff8111f393>] ? seccomp_phase1+0x83/0x220
[ 2745.363612,17] [<ffffffff811e3503>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2b3/0x4e0
[ 2745.363616,17] [<ffffffff811e3771>] SyS_ioctl+0x41/0x70
[ 2745.363619,17] [<ffffffff817c6ffe>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x79
[ 2745.363622,17] ---[ end trace f6954aa440266421 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: fix kernel panic in the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}
When qstats-get operation is executed, callbacks of netdev_stats_ops
are called. The bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx} collect per-queue stats
from sw_stats in the rings.
But {rx | tx | cp}_ring are allocated when the interface is up.
So, these rings are not allocated when the interface is down.
The qstats-get is allowed even if the interface is down. However,
the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}() accesses cp_ring and tx_ring
without null check.
So, it needs to avoid accessing rings if the interface is down.
Reproducer:
ip link set $interface down
./cli.py --spec netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get
OR
ip link set $interface down
python ./stats.py
Splat looks like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 1680fa067 P4D 1680fa067 PUD 16be3b067 PMD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1495 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4+ #32 5cd0f999d5a15c574ac72b3e4b907341
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
RIP: 0010:bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en]
Code: c6 87 b5 18 00 00 02 eb a2 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 01
RSP: 0018:ffffabef43cdb7e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc04c8710 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffabef43cdb858 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8d504e850000
RBP: ffff8d506c9f9c00 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffff8d506bcd901c
R10: 0000000000000015 R11: ffff8d506bcd9000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffabef43cdb8c0 R14: ffff8d504e850000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f2c5462b080(0000) GS:ffff8d575f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000167fd0000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x20/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460
? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x58d/0xd10
? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en cdd546fd48563c280cfd30e9647efa420db07bf1]
netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2b1/0x4e0
? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0
? xa_find+0x8b/0xe0
netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xbf/0x1e0
genl_dumpit+0x31/0x90
netlink_dump+0x1a8/0x360 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: virt: acrn: hsm: Use kzalloc to avoid info leak in pmcmd_ioctl
In the "pmcmd_ioctl" function, three memory objects allocated by
kmalloc are initialized by "hcall_get_cpu_state", which are then
copied to user space. The initializer is indeed implemented in
"acrn_hypercall2" (arch/x86/include/asm/acrn.h). There is a risk of
information leakage due to uninitialized bytes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.
However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.
To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.
The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:
[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
// for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
// store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]
After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.
In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.
Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: media: max96712: fix kernel oops when removing module
The following kernel oops is thrown when trying to remove the max96712
module:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00007375746174db
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000010af89000
[00007375746174db] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: crct10dif_ce polyval_ce mxc_jpeg_encdec flexcan
snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card snd_soc_fsl_micfil dwc_mipi_csi2
imx_csi_formatter polyval_generic v4l2_jpeg imx_pcm_dma can_dev
snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_wm8962 snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_fsl_utils
max96712(C-) rpmsg_ctrl rpmsg_char pwm_fan fuse
[last unloaded: imx8_isi]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 754 Comm: rmmod
Tainted: G C 6.12.0-rc6-06364-g327fec852c31 #17
Tainted: [C]=CRAP
Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : led_put+0x1c/0x40
lr : v4l2_subdev_put_privacy_led+0x48/0x58
sp : ffff80008699bbb0
x29: ffff80008699bbb0 x28: ffff00008ac233c0 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff000080cf1170 x22: ffff00008b53bd00 x21: ffff8000822ad1c8
x20: ffff000080ff5c00 x19: ffff00008b53be40 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffff0000800f8010 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff000082acf5c0 x10: ffff000082acf478 x9 : ffff0000800f8010
x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : fefefeff6364626d
x5 : 8080808000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 00000000553a3dc1
x2 : ffff00008ac233c0 x1 : ffff00008ac233c0 x0 : ff00737574617473
Call trace:
led_put+0x1c/0x40
v4l2_subdev_put_privacy_led+0x48/0x58
v4l2_async_unregister_subdev+0x2c/0x1a4
max96712_remove+0x1c/0x38 [max96712]
i2c_device_remove+0x2c/0x9c
device_remove+0x4c/0x80
device_release_driver_internal+0x1cc/0x228
driver_detach+0x4c/0x98
bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
i2c_del_driver+0x54/0x64
max96712_i2c_driver_exit+0x18/0x1d0 [max96712]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1a4/0x290
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: f9000bf3 aa0003f3 f9402800 f9402000 (f9403400)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This happens because in v4l2_i2c_subdev_init(), the i2c_set_cliendata()
is called again and the data is overwritten to point to sd, instead of
priv. So, in remove(), the wrong pointer is passed to
v4l2_async_unregister_subdev(), leading to a crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: fix xdp_rxq_info bug after suspend/resume
The following sequence currently causes a driver bug warning
when using virtio_net:
# ip link set eth0 up
# echo mem > /sys/power/state (or e.g. # rtcwake -s 10 -m mem)
<resume>
# ip link set eth0 down
Missing register, driver bug
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 375 at net/core/xdp.c:138 xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
Call trace:
xdp_rxq_info_unreg+0x58/0x60
virtnet_close+0x58/0xac
__dev_close_many+0xac/0x140
__dev_change_flags+0xd8/0x210
dev_change_flags+0x24/0x64
do_setlink+0x230/0xdd0
...
This happens because virtnet_freeze() frees the receive_queue
completely (including struct xdp_rxq_info) but does not call
xdp_rxq_info_unreg(). Similarly, virtnet_restore() sets up the
receive_queue again but does not call xdp_rxq_info_reg().
Actually, parts of virtnet_freeze_down() and virtnet_restore_up()
are almost identical to virtnet_close() and virtnet_open(): only
the calls to xdp_rxq_info_(un)reg() are missing. This means that
we can fix this easily and avoid such problems in the future by
just calling virtnet_close()/open() from the freeze/restore handlers.
Aside from adding the missing xdp_rxq_info calls the only difference
is that the refill work is only cancelled if netif_running(). However,
this should not make any functional difference since the refill work
should only be active if the network interface is actually up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel data leak
For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe
less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data
that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory
that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data.
Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these
sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: nosy: ensure user_length is taken into account when fetching packet contents
Ensure that packet_buffer_get respects the user_length provided. If
the length of the head packet exceeds the user_length, packet_buffer_get
will now return 0 to signify to the user that no data were read
and a larger buffer size is required. Helps prevent user space overflows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: sunxi-ng: h6: Reparent CPUX during PLL CPUX rate change
While PLL CPUX clock rate change when CPU is running from it works in
vast majority of cases, now and then it causes instability. This leads
to system crashes and other undefined behaviour. After a lot of testing
(30+ hours) while also doing a lot of frequency switches, we can't
observe any instability issues anymore when doing reparenting to stable
clock like 24 MHz oscillator. |
